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Abstract As an important infrastructure system, civil
aviation network system can be severely affected by nat-
ural hazards. Although a natural hazard is usually local, its
impact, through the network topology, can become global.
Inspired by Wilkinson’s work in 2012, this article proposes
a new quantitative spatial vulnerability model for network
systems, which emphasizes the spreading impact of spa-
tially localized hazards on these systems. This model
considers hazard location and area covered by a hazard,
and spatially spreading impact of the hazard (including
direct impact and indirect impact through network topol-
ogy) and proposes an absolute spatial vulnerability index
and a relative spatial vulnerability index to reflect the
vulnerability of a network system to local hazards. The
model is then applied to study the spatial vulnerability of
the Chinese civil aviation network system. The simulation
results show that (1) the proposed model is effective and
useful to study spatial vulnerability of civil aviation net-
work systems as the results well explain the general situ-
ation of the Chinese civil aviation system; and (2) the
Chinese civil aviation network system is highly vulnerable
to local hazards when indirect impacts through network
connections are considered.
Keywords Civil aviation  Network system  Spatially
localized hazards  Vulnerability
1 Introduction
Civil aviation, as an advanced transportation mode, is not
only closely linked with our daily life, but also significantly
important for the economic development of countries and
regions. According to the 2013 Annual Report of the
International Civil Aviation Organization Council (ICAO
2014), the number of world air passengers reached 3.1
billion, air freight (expressed as freight ton-kilometer per-
formed) rose to approximately 49.3 million tons, and net
profit of the world air transport reached USD 181 billion in
2013. As an important sector of the economy, civil aviation
system has become a crucial infrastructure system sup-
porting the modernization of economies and societies and
promoting the development of various other related
industries, such as tourism, trade, and logistics. However,
in the context of global climate change, the sustainable
development of the world civil aviation industry is facing
increasingly more severe challenges imposed by frequent
natural hazards, especially meteorological hazards. Gen-
erally, these hazards are spatially restricted, so we use the
term ‘‘spatially localized hazards’’ in this article.
Spatially localized hazards, such as torrential rain,
typhoon, snowstorm, and dust storm, may directly result in
closure of airports and routes, damage airport and en-route
navigation equipment/facilities, cause severe flight delays,
and lead to aviation accidents and even catastrophes. For
example, the 2010 eruption of the Eyjafjallajokull Volcano
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in Iceland resulted in the closures of European airports and
routes at a very large scale, causing more than 10 million
passenger delays (Mazzocchi et al. 2010). Civil aviation
system, as a network system, may be globally influenced
by such spatially localized hazards, as negative effects of
the hazards can spread along flight routes between airports
in the system. For example, as shown in Fig. 1, assuming a
local hazard happens in a simplified civil aviation network
system, where Airport 1 is directly affected by the hazard.
As Airport 2 has flights from/to Airport 1, it will be dis-
turbed indirectly by the hazard because flights between
Airport 2 and Airport 1 may not take off on time or be
forced to cancel. Although Airport 3 has no direct flights
from/to Airport 1, it may also be impacted indirectly
because Airport 3 has flights from/to Airport 2, which are
likely to be affected by the delays or cancelation of flights
between Airport 1 and Airport 2. Finally, the whole system
is affected by the hazard. Therefore, it is important to study
the impacts of local hazards on civil aviation network
system.
Vulnerability is an important concept to assess the
performance of a system in the presence of hazards. At
present, studies on the vulnerability of civil aviation net-
work system are concentrated in the field of system sci-
ence. Researchers mainly apply complex network theories
to study the performances and characteristics of different
network topologies in the face of hazards (Burghouwt et al.
2003; Chi et al. 2003; Gastner and Newman 2006). Many
countries’ civil aviation systems have been proved to be
scale-free networks, whose degree distribution follows a
power law and therefore comprises a small number of high-
degree nodes, that is, hub nodes, and a large number of
low-degree nodes, that is, spoke nodes (Guimera and
Amaral 2004; Li and Cai 2004). Such networks have been
shown to be resilient to random hazards but are vulnerable
to intended attacks, because when compared with an
intended attack especially targeting at hub nodes, a random
hazard has a much smaller possibility to cover and affect a
hub node (Albert et al. 2000). Most of the existing studies
mainly focus on network topology, largely ignoring the
spatial distribution of hazards, as well as the spreading
impact of spatially localized hazards, which may have
increasingly adverse impact on civil aviation systems under
the background of global climate change. Some researchers
have considered the impact of spatial hazards when
studying vulnerability of civil aviation networks. Wilkin-
son et al. (2012) qualitatively analyzed the spatial vulner-
ability of the European air traffic network after the 2010
eruption of the Eyjafjallajokull Volcano. Janic´ (2015)
developed an integrated model to analyze the resilience,
friability, and costs of the northeast part of the US air
transport network affected by Hurricane Sandy in October
2012. Our research further proposes a quantitative method
to study the spatial vulnerability of civil aviation network
systems affected by local hazards.
In Sect. 2, a new quantitative spatial vulnerability model
is introduced to assess the performance of network systems
in the presence of spatially localized hazards from the
viewpoint of disaster science. This model simultaneously
considers characteristics of spatially localized hazards and
topologies of network systems, and emphasizes on the
spreading impact of the hazards. Based on the model, we
carry out a case study on the spatial vulnerability of the
Chinese civil aviation network system, and report some
simulation results in Sect. 3. The main conclusions are
presented in Sect. 4.
2 A Quantitative Spatial Vulnerability Model
for Network Systems
When defining vulnerability of a system (IPCC 2001;
Cutter et al. 2003; Turner et al. 2003; Shi et al. 2009),
researchers have paid little attention to the spreading
impact of local hazards transmitted through networks.
Although Wilkinson et al. (2012) has made an attempt to
analyze the spatial vulnerability of the European air traffic
network, the study lacks explicit definition and a quanti-
tative method for spatial vulnerability analysis of network
systems. In response, our study first defines the spatial
vulnerability of a network system as the likelihood of a
given system as a whole to be harmed from exposure to
local hazards, such as rainstorms and earthquakes. Then,
Fig. 1 A local hazard-impact scenario in a simplified civil aviation
network system
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the model proposed in this article focuses on how to
mathematically formulate and quantify the spatial vulner-
ability of a network system.
2.1 Basic Idea
In various fields of system engineering, researchers have
developed many methods to analyze the vulnerability of
network systems, including maximal flow (Wollmer 1964;
Ghare et al. 1971; Wood 1993), shortest path (Corley and
Sha 1982; Israeli and Wood 2002; Lim and Smith 2007),
connectivity (Grubesic et al. 2003; Murray and Grubesic
2007; Arulselvan et al. 2009), system flow (Myung and
Kim 2004; Murray et al. 2007), access fortification (Church
et al. 2004; Church and Scaparra 2007), and component
attributes approach (Grubesic and Murray 2006). Basically,
these methods aim to find components in a network that, if
removed or rendered inoperable, would influence the sys-
tem performance most significantly. Network topology is
usually the focus of such vulnerability analysis methods.
Hazard characteristics, although prominent in vulnerability
research in the disaster risk field (where dose–response
analysis is a well-known method) (Li et al. 2008; Ding and
Miao 2014), are largely overlooked. Dose–response
methods are useful for assessing the vulnerability of indi-
vidual units in a network system (Tran et al. 2010; Zhou
et al. 2014), but they often fail to consider the spreading
impact and/or cascading effect of spatially localized haz-
ards on a system because of network topology.
Our proposed model is based on the traditional vulner-
ability curve method. The basic idea of traditional vul-
nerability curve is to build a functional relationship
between hazard intensity and hazard impact for a specific
hazard category (Jaiswal et al. 2011; Omidvar et al. 2012;
Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al. 2012). Figure 2 presents an
example of such method. This vulnerability curve can
illustrate how a system performs under a given hazard.
Here, system performance is used in a general sense, which
may refer to certain function or property of a system to be
likely affected by hazards. That is, the vulnerability curve
depicts to what extent a system may be affected by hazards
in terms of certain function or property with which we are
most concerned. However, the curve cannot tell how the
system’s vulnerability is related to the location of a hazard,
size of the hazard covered area, and direct and indirect
impacts of the hazard. For a given hazard category with a
specific hazard intensity, different hazard locations may
lead to different impacts on a system. For example, a
rainstorm in an area with dense airports usually has a more
severe impact on an aviation system than that happens in an
area with few airports, because more flights could be
cancelled or delayed due to the rainstorm occurred in the
area with more airports. For a given hazard intensity, dif-
ferent sizes of area covered by hazard may also result in
different impacts on a system. Whether to consider indirect
impacts of hazards through network connections will also
make a great difference in assessing the vulnerability of a
network system.
According to the definition of spatial vulnerability in
this article, two basic factors are important to calculate the
spatial vulnerability of a network system: area covered by
hazards (multiple hazards may occur simultaneously in
different locations in a network system), and spatially
spreading impact of hazards (including direct impact and
indirect impact of hazards). Then, for a given hazard
intensity, we can establish a mathematical relationship
between these two factors, and therefore get an impact
curve between area covered by the multi-hazards and
spreading impact of hazards. Hazards at different locations
may have greatly different influences on a system, even
with the same hazard covered area. More descriptions are
introduced in Sect. 2.3. Note that this new impact curve is
different from the traditional vulnerability curve, which is
between hazard intensity and impact of hazard (Fig. 2). In
addition to the new impact curve, we further introduce a
concept of ‘‘neutral line,’’ in order to analyze spatial vul-
nerability in a relative term.
2.2 Concept of Neutral Line
The concept of neutral line can be explained by examining
the following two questions.
Question 1 After a rainstorm with a return period of
100 years, a megacity with a GDP of USD 10 billion per
year recorded a loss of USD 10,000. Is this city vulnerable
to rainstorms?
Question 2 After an earthquake, a modern skyscraper
recorded a loss of USD 1 million because of damages to its
interior decorations, while a very small historical building
recorded a loss of USD 0.1 million because it wasFig. 2 Traditional vulnerability curve model
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completely destroyed. Which building is more vulnerable
to earthquake?
If vulnerability is measured by absolute loss terms or the
impact curve, then the city in question 1 will be considered
vulnerable despite the negligible loss caused by the rain-
storm compared to the total GDP of the city, and the
skyscraper in question 2 will be considered more vulner-
able than the small historical building. However, our
common sense would suggest that the city in question 1 is
not vulnerable, and the skyscraper in question 2 is less
vulnerable than the historical building. Therefore, an
impact curve is not sufficient for describing vulnerability.
In this article, we describe the spatial vulnerability of a
network system using not only an impact curve but also a
neutral line. Simply speaking, a neutral line reflects certain
expectation on the resistance of a network system against
spatially localized hazards. In other words, according to
certain knowledge (for example, common sense or theo-
retical analysis) about the resistance of a system, we would
expect/predict the system to record a loss of certain level
under a given hazard scenario. A neutral line is defined
based on such an expected level of loss. If the actual loss
caused by a hazard is below the corresponding expected
level given in the neutral line, it means the actual loss is
expected according to our priori knowledge, and therefore,
we are less likely to be shocked or terrified by the hazard
event. If the actual loss exceeded the expected level, we
may be surprised and consider the system vulnerable to the
hazard.
By this definition, when the spatial vulnerability of a
network system is zero, it does not mean that a hazard has
no impact on the system. Zero vulnerability means the
impact of a hazard is well expected and can be absorbed/
dissipated by the system, and thus has little surprising harm
to the system. For a given hazard intensity and area cov-
ered by the hazard, we can define a threshold of impact
expectation. Only when the actual impact of the hazard is
above the threshold, the system is vulnerable to the hazard.
If the actual impact is below the threshold, the system is
robust to the hazard. If the actual impact equals to the
threshold value, then, the system is neutral to the hazard,
that is, the system vulnerability to the hazard is zero. Under
a given hazard intensity, for different sizes of area covered
by hazards, we have different thresholds of impact
expectation correspondingly. As the size of hazard covered
area changes, the expected impact as threshold also chan-
ges. When the size of the area covered by hazards changes
from zero to the whole network system, the curve formed
by those associated thresholds forms the neutral line under
the given hazard intensity.
A neutral line is a crucial standard against which we can
judge whether or not a network system is vulnerable to
spatially localized hazards. Therefore, a proper definition
of neutral line is very important to study the spatial vul-
nerability of a network system. As mentioned before, a
threshold is a certain expectation on the impact to the
system under a given hazard scenario (specific hazard
intensity and size of area covered by hazards). Therefore, it
can be defined according to problem characteristics or
common senses. For simplicity, in this article, hazard
impact is expected proportional to the size of area covered
by hazards.
For a given hazard intensity, if we have an impact curve
and a neutral line, then we may determine the spatial
vulnerability of a network system qualitatively.
2.3 A Qualitative Method on Spatial Vulnerability
of a Network System
As discussed in Sect. 2.2, to assess the spatial vulnerability
of a network system under a given hazard intensity, we
need to derive two important curves: an impact curve and a
neutral line. Wilkinson et al. (2012) has used the spatial
impacts of a volcanic ash cloud on European air traffic
network as the impact curve and impacts of a random
hazards on the network as the neutral line to qualitatively
analyze the vulnerability of European air traffic network to
spatial hazards. In this article, we introduce a general
approach to derive the impact curve and the neutral line for
determining the vulnerability of a network system.
This study focuses on the vulnerability of network sys-
tems, which are associated with certain spatial areas. A
hazard may cover any part of the area associated with a
network system. For example, in the case of the Chinese
domestic civil aviation network, the territory of China is
the spatial area of the system, and a rainstorm may only
cover a few provinces in China. We divide the size of the
hazard covered area by the size of the entire network
system area, and obtain the percentage of area covered by
the hazards. Hereafter, we define the impact curve by
measuring the spreading impact of hazards on the network
system against the percentage of area covered by hazards.
The definition of spreading impact of hazards on the
network system is highly problem dependent. For example,
we can use the number of impacted nodes in the network
system to quantify the impact of hazards. We can also use
the volume of function losses/failures in the network sys-
tem to calculate the spreading impact of hazards. In this
section of mathematical description, we simply use the
percentage of effectively impacted nodes in the network
system to define the spreading impact of hazards on the
network system.
For a network system, if we know the size of an area
covered by hazards, that is, the percentage of hazard cov-
ered area, then we can analyze the impact of hazards on the
system in terms of the percentage of effectively impacted
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nodes. For example, in Fig. 3b, assuming that three haz-
ards, hazard 1, hazard 2, and hazard 3 happen simultane-
ously in a simplified network system that contains 20
nodes. The area covered by the hazards is 40 % of the total
area of the network system, and 14 nodes of the system are
effectively affected by the hazards, that is, the percentage
of impacted nodes is 70 %. If we move hazard 3 to the
bottom-left side of Fig. 3b, although the total size of areas
covered by the hazards remains the same, the percentage of
effectively impacted nodes decreases to 40 %. This illus-
trates that different hazard locations may have different
impacts on a system—even if the total size of areas covered
by the hazards stays the same, the impact of hazards on the
system as a whole may vary greatly, depending on the
locations of the hazards.
Therefore, we need to further introduce the concept of
average percentage of effectively impacted nodes under a
specific percentage of hazard covered area. That is, in a
network system of fixed nodes distribution and for a given
percentage of hazard covered area, we need to perform
hazard impact simulations for many times by changing
hazard locations, then calculate the average percentage of
effectively impacted nodes, to derive the hazard impact
value under this specific hazard covered area.
When the percentage of hazard covered area changes
from 0 to 100 %, for each specific percentage of hazard
covered area, an average percentage of effectively impac-
ted nodes will result from these simulations. An impact
curve can be plotted by these average percentages of
effectively impacted nodes against the percentages of
hazard covered area (Fig. 3a).
Next, we mathematically define the neutral line. In this
article, for simplicity, a reasonable expectation on the
resistance of a network system against hazards is that the
average percentage of effectively impacted nodes should
equal to the percentage of hazard covered area. Therefore,
the neutral line should be defined as a 45 straight line from
the point (0 %, 0 %) to the point (100 %, 100 %) (the blue
line in Fig. 3a). According to the impact curve and the
neutral line, we can qualitatively determine whether a
network system is vulnerable to spatially localized hazards.
If the impact curve completely overlaps with the neutral
line, the network system is neutral to the hazards. If the
impact curve is mainly above the neutral line, the system is
vulnerable to the hazards (the red line in Fig. 3a). If the
impact curve is mainly below the neutral line, the system is
robust to the hazards (the green line in Fig. 3a).
An impact curve against a neutral line as in Fig. 3a may
illustrate how a network system performs in the face of
spatially localized hazards, but it is still necessary to
develop a quantitative method to calculate the spatial
vulnerability of a network system.
2.4 A Quantitative Method for Spatial Vulnerability
of a Network System
To quantify spatial vulnerability of a network system,
based on the impact curve and neutral line concepts, we
define a spatial vulnerability index (SVI). Preliminary
conceptualizations have been reported in Li et al.
(2014, 2015). For a given network system, if its SVI is
positive, then the system is vulnerable to spatially localized
hazards; if its SVI is zero, then the system is neutral to
spatially localized hazards; if the SVI is negative, then the
system is robust to spatially localized hazards. In the fol-
lowing, we define two specific SVIs: absolute spatial vul-
nerability index (ASVI) and relative spatial vulnerability
index (RSVI).
Fig. 3 Impact curve and neutral line (a) and calculation for impact of hazards with a specific hazard covered area (b)
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(1) Absolute spatial vulnerability index (ASVI)
The ASVI is calculated as the integral value of the
difference between the impact curve and the neutral line in
Fig. 3a as the percentage of hazard covered area changes




ðgðxÞ  gNLðxÞÞdx ð1Þ
where x is the percentage of hazard covered area, g(x) is the
average percentage of effectively impacted nodes under a
given x value, and gNL(x) is the associated neutral line
value. According to the definition of the neutral line in
Sect. 2.3, this study employs
gNLðxÞ ¼ x ð2Þ
As a quantified spatial vulnerability measurement, the
ASVI has more advantages than the illustrative plot in
Fig. 3a for analyzing the performance of a network system
in the face of spatially localized hazards. For example, in a
more general case, as illustrated in Fig. 4, the impact curve
(in red) may be above the neutral line in certain x range,
whilst below the neutral line in other x range. In such cases,
an illustrative plot of impact curve and neutral line can
hardly help to draw a conclusion regarding the spatial
vulnerability of a network system. The ASVI can help
determine whether a network system is vulnerable, neutral,
or robust to spatially localized hazards. In other words, if
the ASVI is positive/zero/negative, then the system is
vulnerable/neutral/robust to spatially localized hazards.
Furthermore, the ASVI also makes it possible to
quantitatively compare the spatial vulnerability of
different network systems, because the value of ASVI
can indicate to what extent a network system is vulnerable/
neutral/robust. Basically, a higher positive value of ASVI
means more vulnerable, whilst a lower negative value of
ASVI means more robust.
(2) Relative spatial vulnerability index (RSVI)
The ASVI may quantitatively answer question 1 in
Sect. 2.2, that is, whether a system is vulnerable or not, but
may not be able to address question 2 in Sect. 2.2, that is,
to compare two systems. For another example, the ASVI
cannot distinguish the vulnerability of the system in Fig. 4
from that of the system in Fig. 5 under a same hazard
scenario, as these two systems have the same ASVI value.
However, a large network system in Fig. 4 is more vul-
nerable to spatially localized hazards because of the higher
likelihood of occurrence of small-scale hazards with rela-
tively low percentage of hazard covered areas. Therefore,






For a same value of g(x)-gNL(x), small-scale hazards
have a smaller gNL(x) value than large-scale hazards. As a
result, the system in Fig. 4 has a larger RSVI than the
system in Fig. 5. This indicates that the system in Fig. 4 is
more vulnerable to spatially localized hazards than the
system in Fig. 5.
3 A Case Study
We apply the proposed spatial vulnerability model to study
the Chinese domestic civil aviation network system. In this
case, network nodes refer to airports and links between
nodes refer to direct flights between airports. To compre-
hensively analyze the spatial vulnerability of the Chinese
civil aviation network system to local hazards, we use three
hazard scenarios. In scenario 1, the occurrence probability
of hazards is assumed equal everywhere in the whole
country, that is, hazards follow a uniform spatial distribu-
tion. In scenario 2 and scenario 3, the distribution of
Fig. 4 Absolute spatial vulnerability index (ASVI) Fig. 5 Relative spatial vulnerability index (RSVI)
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hazards in China is spatially uneven. In scenario 2, we
determine the occurrence probability of hazards in different
areas based on the spatial distribution of rainstorms in
China. In scenario 3, we derive the occurrence probability
of hazards according to the spatial distribution of sand-
storms in China. For each hazard scenario, we set up three
test cases with different considerations of impact:
Test case 1 Only consider the airports located in the area
covered by the hazards;
Test case 2 Also take into account airports that have
direct flights from/to any airport located in the area covered
by the hazards;
Test case 3 Only consider the daily passenger capacity
of airports located in the area covered by the hazards. The
daily passenger capacity of an airport is the sum of aircraft
capacity of all flights from/to the airport during an opera-
tional day.
3.1 Data
From the largest Chinese travel website Qunar (2014), we
collected the flight data of 174 Chinese civil airports, which are
taken as the nodes of the network (Figs. 6, 7). The connections
of network are set up based on the flights between these 174
airports in the period from 1 to 30 April 2014. The daily pas-
senger capacity of an airport is the average result based on all
flights from/to the airport during the 30 day period. The daily
passenger capacity between a pair of airports is the sum of
aircraft capacity of all flights between the two airports. We used
the data of flights and passenger capacities to set up an airport-
link matrix and a passenger-capacity matrix.
The distribution of rainstorms and sandstorms is
obtained as follows: we first collected the data on the
occurrences of rainstorms and sandstorms at or near the
airport sites between 2004 and 2013 from the Chinese
Meteorological Data Services (Chinese Meteorological
Data Services n.d.). Then, using the ArcGIS software and
the inverse distance weighted method (IDW), the spatial
distribution surfaces of rainstorms and sandstorms were
generated (Figs. 6, 7). In the next step, we use the Jenks
method in ArcGIS to divide the spatial distribution of
rainstorms and sandstorms into four levels: low, relatively
low, relatively high, and high (Figs. 6, 7). These four levels
are used to determine the hazard occurrence probability in
a given area. For example, in the hazard simulation, if an
area has a low/relatively low/relatively high/high level of
rainstorms, then the probability for a rainstorm to happen
in this area is 0.2/0.4/0.6/0.8.
Fig. 6 Spatial distribution of Chinese civil airports and rainstorm occurrence frequencies
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3.2 Results and Analyses
In order to perform the hazard impact simulation, we first
divide the map of China into 20 9 25 grids. Grids that are
completely within the Chinese territory are assigned a size
value of 1. Grids on the border of the Chinese territory,
depending on how much of the grid is within China, take a
size value between 0 and 1. The total area size of the
Chinese territory is derived by summing up these size
values. The hazard occurrence probability for each grid is
determined based on the spatial distribution of random
hazards, rainstorms, and sandstorms. The hazard occur-
rence probability of random hazards is the same for all
grids. For any specific percentage of hazard covered area,
we can calculate the number of grids needed to make up
such a percentage, and then randomly choose the appro-
priate number of grids as the hazard covered areas. Finally,
we calculate the percentage of effectively impacted nodes
by hazards through counting the number of airports in the
hazard covered grids.
In this article, for each test case, we change the per-
centage of hazard covered area from 0 to 100 % by a step
of 0.5 %. For each given percentage of hazard covered
area, we conduct 100 hazard simulation tests. The simu-
lation results are given in Fig. 8. The SVI values of the
Chinese civil aviation network system are presented in
Table 1, in which lower ASVI/RSVI values mean higher
robustness of the Chinese civil aviation network system to
the hazards, and vice versa. When the ASVI/RSVI values
are close to zero, the system behaves neutrally to the
hazards.
In scenario 1 where hazards have a uniform spatial
distribution, if we only consider airports directly impacted
by the hazards (that is, airports in the area covered by the
hazards, test case 1) the ASVI is -0.8363 and the RSVI is
-1.7384 (Table 1). Both indices have negative values, and
the associated impact curve is slightly below the neutral
line (Fig. 8a). This indicates that the Chinese civil aviation
network system is slightly robust to spatially localized
hazards with uniform distribution. The reason is that most
Chinese airports are located in the southeastern area of the
country, that is, the spatial distribution of airports is not
uniform in reality (Figs. 6, 7). Therefore, a hazard with a
uniform spatial distribution will impact fewer airports
when compared with the neutral line (the impact curve
when both hazards and airports follow a uniform
distribution).
As explained in Sect. 2, in a network system, the impact
of a spatially localized hazard may spread from covered
area to non-covered area. Therefore, to comprehensively
Fig. 7 Spatial distribution of Chinese civil airports and sandstorm occurrence frequencies
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assess the performance (spatial vulnerability in this study)
of a network system, we need to take into account the
impact of hazards on those airports that are not directly
covered by the hazards. In test case 2 of scenario 1 we
consider not only the directly impacted airports, but also
those that have direct flights from/to the directly impacted
airports. In this case, both the ASVI and the RSVI become
positive (Table 1), and the impact curve is largely above
the neutral line (Fig. 8b). This indicates that, when con-
sidering connections between airports, the Chinese civil
aviation network system is highly vulnerable to spatially
localized hazards, even though the spatial distribution of
hazards is uniform, and that of airports, is not uniform.
Also as discussed in Sect. 2, the impact of hazards on a
network system can be evaluated using different indicators.
The number of effectively impacted airports can be used to
Fig. 8 Simulation results on the spatial vulnerability of the Chinese civil aviation network system (a–i)
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quantify the impact of hazards. Likewise, daily passenger
capacity losses of airports in the system can also signify the
impact of hazards. An airport with a larger passenger
capacity is clearly more important than an airport with a
smaller capacity in the civil aviation network system. Thus,
in test case 3 of scenario 1, we consider the passenger
capacity at the directly impacted airports, that is, when
plotting the impact curve, we replace effectively impacted
airports with effectively impacted passenger capacities.
The result shows that, by including the passenger capacity
consideration, the Chinese civil aviation network system is
still slightly robust to spatially localized hazards with
uniform distribution. The main reason is that most eco-
nomic activities, which demand larger transportation
capacities, including airport capacities, are concentrated in
the southeastern area of China. In other words, the spatial
distribution of airport passenger capacities is not uniform
in reality. Therefore, in terms of directly impacted pas-
senger capacities, the system is robust to spatially localized
hazards with a uniform distribution.
In scenario 2 and scenario 3, we conduct simulation
studies on hazards with non-uniform distribution. In sce-
nario 2, the occurrence probability of hazards is determined
by the spatial distribution of rainstorms occurrences in
China (Fig. 6), that is, the higher rainstorm probability a
location has, the greater possibility the hazard may occur.
Table 1 and Fig. 8d–f clearly show that, in all the three test
cases of scenario 2, the ASVI and RSVI values are
Table 1 Spatial vulnerability index values of the Chinese civil aviation network system
Test case 1 Test case 2 Test case 3
VASVI VRSVI VASVI VRSVI VASVI VRSVI
Scenario 1 -0.8363 -1.7384 50.6176 247.9066 -1.1446 -3.0734
Scenario 2 5.6979 18.7048 53.1297 276.8941 8.2663 25.2023
Scenario 3 -8.4845 -21.4787 47.3522 226.0798 -6.3092 -16.0187
Fig. 8 continued
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positive, which indicate the Chinese civil aviation network
system is highly vulnerable to rainstorms. The explanation
is that the spatial distribution of rainstorms is largely
consistent with that of airports in China (Fig. 6), that is, the
airports are concentrated in the areas with high frequency
of rainstorms. Sufficient rainfall is associated with higher
agriculture production, which is in turn crucial to sup-
porting other economic activities that have a demand for
airports. If a hazard often occurs in areas with dense air-
ports, it will certainly cause severe disruption to the
system.
In scenario 3, when hazard spatial distribution is deter-
mined by sandstorm occurrences (Fig. 7), the vulnerability
assessment results are very different from scenario 2.
Specifically, ASVI and RSVI values in all three test cases
of scenario 3 are less than that in scenario 2. In test case 1
and test case 3 of scenario 3, the simulation results show
that the Chinese civil aviation network system is robust to
sandstorms. On the contrary, in test case 1 and test case 3
of scenario 2, the system is vulnerable to rainstorms. This
is because the spatial distribution of sandstorms in China is
not consistent with the distribution of airports (see Fig. 7).
Frequent severe sandstorms often happen in areas with
sparse airports. Therefore, the Chinese civil aviation net-
work system is robust to sandstorms.
Furthermore, in any scenario, when compared with
either test case 1 or test case 3, test case 2 has much higher
ASVI and RSVI values. These results suggest that, when
taking connections between airports into consideration, the
Chinese civil aviation network system is vulnerable to
spatially localized hazards, no matter the spatial distribu-
tion of hazards is uniform or non-uniform. Meanwhile, the
results also imply that the consideration of connections
between nodes for the spreading impact of hazards makes a
great difference and therefore is crucial for studying the
performance of a network system in the face of spatially
localized hazards.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
Inspired by Wilkinson’s study on spatial vulnerability of
the European air traffic network in 2012, this article further
develops a quantitative model to study spatial vulnerability
of civil aviation network systems under the impact of
spatially localized hazards. This model considers hazard
location and hazard covered area, as well as the spatially
spreading impact of hazards, and proposes two spatial
vulnerability indices—the ASVI and the RSVI—to quan-
titatively assess the vulnerability of network systems in the
face of spatially localized hazards.
We apply the spatial vulnerability model to study the
Chinese civil aviation network system under three specific
hazard scenarios. The results show that the proposed spatial
vulnerability model is effective and useful to study civil
aviation network systems as conclusions are well in line
with the general situation of the studied system.
Extensive efforts are still required to explore the full
potential of the proposed spatial vulnerability model. Some
directions for future research include: (1) conduct further
theoretical modification, extension, and analyses of the
proposed spatial vulnerability model, for instance, by
considering the preparedness level against hazards at all
nodes (Li et al. 2015) because a node’s preparedness level
against hazards plays an important role in the spatial vul-
nerability of a network system; consider hazard duration;
investigate how to calculate the indirect impact of spatially
localized hazards more precisely. (2) Study civil aviation
systems in more depth, for example, by collecting more
comprehensive data of airports and flights worldwide and
comparing spatial vulnerability of these systems in differ-
ent countries. (3) Apply the proposed spatial vulnerability
model to study other network systems, such as communi-
cation, energy, and other transportation systems.
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